Federal habeas corpus (§ 2254 / § 2255)
You selected federal habeas without marking these earlier rungs complete: Direct appeal; Discretionary review (state supreme court). Federal habeas requires that you first EXHAUST every federal claim in the state courts (28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)). Filing before you finish the state ladder can get the petition dismissed as unexhausted, and while you go back the AEDPA one-year clock (28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)) may run out — losing the option permanently. Do not file until these are done or a lawyer confirms an exception applies.
Federal habeas is not the next appeal after a loss — it is the LAST step, and it is booby-trapped. Before filing you generally must have taken every federal claim through your state’s ENTIRE process (direct appeal AND state post-conviction) up to the state’s highest court (28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1); Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982)). Filing prematurely, missing the AEDPA one-year clock (28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)), or defaulting a claim (Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991)) can lose the option forever, and a second petition needs the court of appeals’ permission (28 U.S.C. § 2244(b); § 2255(h)). Talk to a lawyer or a federal-defender’s office BEFORE you file.
What this is
A collateral attack in FEDERAL court on a conviction or sentence that violates the U.S. Constitution or federal law. State prisoners use 28 U.S.C. § 2254; federal prisoners use a § 2255 motion in the sentencing court. It is not a second appeal — the review is narrow and deferential to the state courts.
Where it sits in the ladder
This sits ABOVE all the state rungs on purpose. Congress built exhaustion in: a state prisoner must first give the state courts — through direct appeal AND state post-conviction, up to the state’s highest court — a fair chance to fix the error. Only then does the federal door open.
What "burning" this option means
This is the rung people burn most often, and the burns are usually permanent:
• EXHAUSTION — filing before you have taken every federal claim through the full state process (28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1)) gets the petition dismissed; see Rose v. Lundy, 455 U.S. 509 (1982).
• AEDPA 1-YEAR CLOCK — you generally have one year (28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1)) that keeps running; miscount it and the petition is time-barred no matter how strong it is.
• PROCEDURAL DEFAULT — a claim the state rejected on an independent state procedural ground is usually barred federally; see Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
• SUCCESSIVE-PETITION BAR — a second petition needs a court of appeals’ permission first (28 U.S.C. § 2244(b); § 2255(h)). Firing off a weak petition early can spend your one shot.
Who the respondents are
In a § 2254 petition the respondent is your immediate custodian — the warden or superintendent of the facility holding you (named by title). The your state Attorney General represents the state. In a § 2255 motion the respondent is the United States, litigated by the U.S. Attorney in the sentencing district. Look up the office through the directory.
Deadlines that can end the option
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d) / § 2255(f)
Generate: Federal habeas petition (§ 2254 / § 2255) — required fields
This is a fill-in-the-blank scaffold of the sections your document needs. It is AI-generated structure, not a completed filing and not legal advice — fill each field with your own case’s facts, or take it to an attorney or your court’s self-help center.
Format & length rules
- Federal courts require the official AO 241 (§ 2254) / AO 243 (§ 2255) form in most districts
28 U.S.C. § 2254 / § 2255; Rules Governing § 2254 & § 2255 Cases - One-year AEDPA clock — count it precisely and note any statutory tolling
28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)
Governing statutes
Governing authorities (verified)
Cases on point (live · CourtListener)
*651 PATRICK E. HIGGINBOTHAM, Circuit Judge: Christopher DeLeon appeals the district court’s dismissal of his complaint as barred under Heck v. Humphrey. 1 DeLeon’s complaint sought damages under section 19
MEMORANDUM ** Gonzalo Gonzalez was convicted by a California state jury of one count of lewd conduct with a child in violation of CaLPenal Code § 288. After exhausting his direct appeals, he filed a petition for federal habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, arguing that the state court committed a constitutional error by excluding from trial the expert witness in child psychology. The parti
MEMORANDUM ** Calvin Charles appeals from the district court’s denial of his petition for habeas corpus. We affirm. *711We review the denial of a 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas petition de novo. Arredondo v. Ortiz, 365 F.3d 778, 781 (9th Cir. 2004). The merits of this petition are viewed in light of the Antiterrorism and Effecti
OPINION W. FLETCHER, Circuit Judge: Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), state prisoners must file federal petitions for habeas corpus within one year of the date on which the challenged conviction becomes final. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1). That limitations period is tolled while a petitioner’s “properly filed application for
OPINION O’SCANNLAIN, Circuit Judge: We must decide whether a California prisoner’s state habeas petition was timely filed under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. I In 2006, Freddy Curiel was convicted by a California Superior Court jury of first-degree murder and street terrorism. He
MEMORANDUM * Ricky Mitchell Anderson appeals the dismissal of his petition for habeas corpus relief pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. He argues that the district court erred in finding the petition untimely under the one-year statute of limitations imposed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2253, and we reverse and r
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. I. INTRODUCTION Edward Mitchell, a prisoner in the custody of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, appeals from an order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDPA"),
Per Curiam. We granted certiorari in this case, 549 U. S. 1092 (2006), to decide whether the Court of Appeals had exceeded its authority under 28 U. S. C. § 2254(d)(1) by setting aside a capital sentence on the ground that the prosecutor’s closing statement was “unfairly inflammatory.” Weaver v. Bowersox, 438 F. 3d 832, 841 (CA8 2006). Our primary concern was whether the Court of Appeals’ application of the m
BRANCH, Circuit Judge: Derrell Chamblee, a Florida prisoner, appeals the district court's dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for writ of habeas corpus as untimely. Chamblee argues that his § 2254 habeas corpus petition was not untimely because his state court judgment never became final within the meaning
OPINION NGUYEN, Circuit Judge: Brian McMonagle seeks federal habeas review of a California misdemeanor conviction for driving while under the influence of alcohol. The district court dismissed McMonagle’s petition as untimely under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), and he appealed. In order to determine the timeliness of McMona
OPINION JANE B. STRANCH, Circuit Judge. This case concerns the tolling of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA) statute of limitations during the pendency of a State post-conviction motion. Cameron Holbrook, a Michigan prisoner, appeals the district court’s judgment dismissing as untimely his federal habeas corpus petition broug
*339OPINION OF THE COURT [565 U.S. 35] Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AE-DPA), a federal court may not grant habeas relief to a state prisoner with respect to any claim that has been “adjudicated on the merits in State court proceed
MURPHY, Circuit Judge. Christopher Martin filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his Iowa conviction for first degree murder. The district court1 dismissed the appeal as untimely under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s (AEDPA) one year statute of limitations. We granted Martin a certificate of appealability on whether his petition was ti
*862 HANSEN, Circuit Judge. William Eugene Langley appeals the denial of his petition for habeas corpus. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. § 2254. We dismiss the appeal. On April 14, 1997, an Arkansas state jury convicted Langl
Justice Scalia delivered the opinion of the Court. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), a federal court may not grant habeas relief to a state prisoner with respect to any claim that has been “adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings” unless the state-court adjudication “resulted in a decision that was contrary to
*640 OPINION GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. Jose Jurado, a Michigan prisoner, appeals from the order of the district court dismissing his petition for a writ of habeas corpus as time-barred under the applicable one-year statute of limitations set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective D
OPINION REINHARDT, Circuit Judge: Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), a state prisoner is ordinarily prohibited from filing more than one federal petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his conviction or sentence. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). We have previously held, however, that
MEMORANDUM * California state prisoner Michael Wayne Seawright appeals the district court’s denial of his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging his conviction for his part in the 1983 first degree murder of Catherine Shoup, his mother-in-law. Seawright’s petition alleged he was not allowed to present defense evidence that the crime was committed by Catherine’s husband. We affirm t
MEMORANDUM2 Ralph Crenshaw appeals the district court’s dismissal of his habeas corpus petition as untimely under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act’s (“AED-PA”) one-year statute of limitations. We affirm. Crenshaw filed his second habeas petition outside of the AEDPA’s one-year limitation period for state prisoners to file habeas petitions in federal court. He contends t
MEMORANDUM ** Henry Frank Pope appeals from the district court’s judgment denying his 28 U.S.C. § 2254 habeas corpus petition. Because Pope’s petition is governed by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), to qualify for habeas relief, he must demonstrate that the state court’s determination resulted in an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, or that the decision