Cases

BOWNES, Circuit Judge. This- is an appeal by the Commonwealth of Massachusetts from the granting of a writ of habeas corpus to Michael Simpson by the district court. The court ruled that the racially biased exercise of peremptory challenges by the prosecution fatally tainted the selection of the petitio

GREEN, C.J. *762 The defendant appeals from his convictions of various charges arising from the discovery of a loaded firearm and drugs in a closet in the apartment in which he was arrested. 1 Among his claims on appeal, the defenda

CYPHER, J. The defendant, Thomas A. Woods, appeals from the denial of his motion for a new trial. In 2009, the defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree and sentenced to life in prison. On direct appeal, he challenged the admission of his grand jury testimony -- later used as substantive evidence at trial -- arguing that it was illegally obtained, because he was not informed

LYNCH, Circuit Judge. The Commonwealth of Massachusetts seeks to recover response costs under CERCLA and Mass.Gen.L. ch. 21E from Blackstone Valley Electric Co. (“BVE”) for the removal of ferric ferroeyanide (“FFC”) from a waste site in North Attleboro, Massachusetts. The Commonwealth’s ability to recover its response costs, said to be $5.8 million, turns largely on the question

622 F.Supp. 304 (1984) Michael SIMPSON, a/k/a Woods, Petitioner, v. COMMONWEALTH OF MASSACHUSETTS, Respondent. Civ. A. No. 81-1193-S. United States District Court, D. Massachusetts. July 20, 1984. Findings, Rulings and Order October 30, 1985. *305 Robert A. Murphy, Boston, Mass., for petitioner. Michael W.

Cordy, J. In the early morning hours of December 2, 2005, the defendant, Thomas A. Woods, and the victim, Paul Mullen, left a nightclub and agreed to meet later to smoke marijuana. The defendant drove to the local Hess gasoline station located in the city of Brockton, which was a popular late-night meeting place. When the victim telephoned the defendant to ask where he was, the defendant told him he was at Hess, and the victim sa

TREVOR N. MCFADDEN, U.S.D.J. Corinthian Colleges, Inc., once operated over a hundred for-profit college campuses across the country. Multiple state and federal investigations revealed that Corinthian defrauded students by falsifying its post-graduation job placement data. Facing millions of dollars in fines and allegations of deceptive marketing, Corinthian filed for bankruptcy and announced the closure of its schools in 2015. <

SENTELLE, Circuit Judge, dissenting in part and concurring in the judgment. As the majority’s opinion observes, courts of the United States must resolve jurisdictional questions, including “Article III standing questions, before proceeding to the merits of a case.” Opinion of Judge Randolph at 53 (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 118 S

BUDD, J. **2*700Until recently, we provided only limited guidance regarding legal instructions furnished to grand juries. We had held, for example, that "it is the duty of the district attorney in appropriate instances to advise [the grand jury] concerning the

ORDER PER CURIAM. The petition of petitioners Commonwealth of Massachusetts, States of Maine, Oregon, Rhode Island, and Washington, and the District of Columbia for rehearing en banc and the opposition thereto were circulated to the full court, and a vote was requested. Thereafter a majority of the judges eligible to participate did not vote in favor of the petition. Upon consideration of the foregoi

Again, although evidence of an operator's intoxication is relevant to a charge of negligent operation, a conviction of negligent operation requires something more than just operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of alcohol. The two crimes are separate. In the circumstances presented, the scant evidence of a broken headlight and a broken license plate light, even when coupled with proof of intoxication, is insufficient to warrant a finding that

KAFKER, J. **36 *1187 The police quickly identified the defendant as the person suspected of murdering the victim with a sawed-off shotgun. In an attempt to pinpoint the location of the fleeing

GANTS, C.J. **517 Rule 36 of the Massachusetts Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended, 422 Mass. 1503 (1996) ( rule 36 ), provides that, if a criminal defendant is not

Gants, C.J. These interlocutory appeals from two rulings on motions to suppress raise three substantial issues regarding eyewitness identification. First, we consider what consequence, if any, is appropriate where a police officer who is showing a photographic array to an eyewitness fails to use the protocol that we outlined in Commonwealth v. Silva-San

Hines, J. The defendant, Kyle Alleyne, was convicted by a jury of murder in the first degree on the theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty 1 for the stabbing death of his wife, Heather Alleyne, and of assault and battery of Josh Elinoff, the father of the victim’s newborn baby.

Spina, J. In this case we are asked to decide whether the words “wantonly or recklessly” in G. L. c. 265, § 13L, the statute proscribing reckless endangerment of a child, require proof of a defendant’s subjective state of mind. 1 On August 20, 2013, a two-count complaint issued against the defendant from the Plym

Cordy, J. The defendant, Michael Boyd, was convicted on indictments charging two sentencing enhancements, one as a second-time offender, see G. L. c. 269, § 10 (d), and one under the Massachusetts armed career criminal (ACC) statute, 1 see G. L. c. 269, § 10G (c), both premised on an underlying convictio

Dufely, J. The defendant was convicted of murder in the first degree, G. L. c. 265, § 1, on a theory of extreme atrocity or cruelty in the May 27, 2010, shooting death of James Tigges at a party in Plymouth. 1 The defendant also was convicted of armed assault with intent to murder, and assault and battery by means of a danger

Botsford, J. We consider here five questions reported by a Superior Court judge to the Appeals Court concerning the effect of an amendment to Mass. R. Prof. C. 3.5 (c), as appearing in 471 Mass. 1428 (2015) (rule 3.5 [c]), regarding an attorney’s ability to communicate, postverdict, with jurors who deliberated on, or were discharged from, the attorney’s client’s case. Rule 3.5 (c) be

Gants, C.J. The defendant was convicted by a Superior Court jury of assault and battery on a child causing substantial bodily injury, in violation of G. L. c. 265, § 13J (&). The prosecution contended that the defendant violently shook the two year old child in his care based on medical testimony that the child was diagnosed with traumatic brain injury, and scans of her brain th