Cases

Peterson, Judge. Leslie and Kathy Kicklighter’s house burned down. Central Mutual Insurance Company, with whom they had a homeowners’ insurance policy, paid them several hundred thousand dollars under the policy The Kicklighters contended they were owed still more; when Central Mutual did not pay, the Kicklighters sued them for bad faith. Central Mutual responded to the lawsuit b

ORDER LISA GODBEY WOOD, CHIEF JUDGE This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (dkt. no. 23) and Motion to Strike (dkt. no. 39), as well as Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (dkt. no. 28) and Motion to Strike (dkt. no. 57).1 For *1335the reasons set forth below, Plaint

Motion for reargument or leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals denied. Present — Whalen, P.J., Smith, Peradotto, Carni and Lindley, JJ.

Whalen, J. (dissenting). Plaintiff commenced this action seeking, inter alia, a declaration that defendant must indemnify him in an underlying personal injury action, Sciortino v Leo. The complaint in the underlying action seeks damages for the wrongful death and conscious pain and suffering of Anthony J. Sciortino (decedent), who was killed in a violent altercation with plaintiff. The administrator of decedent’s estat

Motion for reargument or leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals denied. Present — Whalen, P.J., Smith, Peradotto, Carni and Lindley, JJ.

Whalen, J. (dissenting). Plaintiff commenced this action seeking, inter alia, a declaration that defendant must indemnify him in an underlying personal injury action, Sciortino v Leo. The complaint in the underlying action seeks damages for the wrongful death and conscious pain and suffering of Anthony J. Sciortino (decedent), who was killed in a violent altercation with plaintiff. The administrator of decedent’s estat

Motion insofar as it seeks in the alternative leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals denied and the motion insofar as it seeks leave to reargue, deemed a motion seeking leave to renew (.see CPLR 2221 [e] [2]; Karlin v Bridges, 172 AD2d 644, 645 [1991]), is granted in part and, upon renewal, the memoran*1427dum and order entered February 7, 2014 (114 AD3d 1151) is amended by de

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Erie County (Donna M. Siwek, J.), entered March 19, 2004. The order denied the motion of defendants Tracey Boyette and Kameron Wilson and the cross motion of defendant William F. Smith seeking dismissal of the complaint pursuant to CPLR 3211 in a declaratory judgment action. It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from be and the same hereby is unanimously reversed on the law without

Spain, J. Appeal from an order and judgment of the Supreme Court (Relihan, Jr., J.), entered December 16, 2003 in Broome County, which, inter alia, denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint and declared that defendant was required to defend and indemnify plaintiff in an underlying tort action. It is undisputed that at about 10:00 p.m. on July 23, 1999, plaintiff, angered that the

NO. 12-22-00237-CV IN THE COURT OF APPEALS TWELFTH COURT OF APPEALS DISTRICT TYLER, TEXAS IN RE: CENTRAL MUTUAL § INSURANCE COMPANY, § ORIGINAL PROCEEDING RELATOR § MEMORANDUM OPINION In this or

98 N.Y.2d 632 (2002) 772 N.E.2d 1109 745 N.Y.S.2d 751 JOHN AUGUST, Appellant, v. NEW YORK CENTRAL MUTUAL FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, Respondent. Court of Appeals of the State of New York. Argued March 20, 2002. Decided April 30, 2002. Young & Young, Babylon (Richard W. Young of counsel), for appellant.

R.S. Smith, J. (dissenting). Claimants were required under the policy to send a notice to the insurance company “[a]s soon as practicable.” The Court today holds, in substance, that this requirement was nullified because the insurance company did not, as soon as possible after as soon as practicable, send claimants a notice that they had failed to send a notice. The Catch-22 quality of this holding is too much for me, and I dissen

OPINION OF THE COURT ClPARICK, J. The issue presented by this appeal is the meaning of the words “arising out of ’ in an “uninsured premises” exclusion contained in a homeowners insurance policy. Here we hold that “arising out of’ includes use of the premises (as urged by the insurer), and is not limited to the physical condition of the premises (as urged by the insured). On June 19, 1997,

[¶ 1] Steve Jacob and Donald Huck appeal from a judgment dismissing their claims against Nodak Mutual Insurance *Page 606 Company ("Nodak"), Jon Livers, CEO, Keith Kinzler, President of the Board, and all other members of the Board, individually, and as CEO and members of the Board of Directors for Nodak Mutual Insurance Company and Farm Bureau Life Insurance Company, and from an order denying their motions for reconsideration or relief from the j

USCA11 Case: 22-11082 Document: 72-1 Date Filed: 07/21/2025 Page: 1 of 25 [PUBLISH] In the United States Court of Appeals For the Eleventh Circuit ____________________ No. 22-11082 ____________________ CENTRAL BAPTIST CHURCH OF ALBANY, GEORGIA, INC.

RANDOLPH, PRESIDING JUSTICE, FOR THE COURT: ¶ 1. The Marshall County Circuit Court entered an order dismissing Adlai Johnson from the suit for Plaintiffs' failure to timely serve him. 1 Church Mutual Insurance Company ("Church Mutual") then moved to have the trial court declare that Tennessee substantive law c

Smith, Judge. Southern Guaranty Insurance Company (“Southern Guaranty”) filed a complaint against Central Mutual Insurance Company (“Central Mutual”) seeking contribution for post-judgment interest. Cross-motions for summary judgment were filed, and the trial court granted Central Mutual’s motion, denying that of Southern Guaranty. Southern Guaranty brought this appeal. We find that summary judgment was correctly granted to Ce

OPINION Opinion by Justice Fillmore David Eoff was involved in a traffic accident with Charles Cabaniss, an insured of Central Mutual Insurance Company (Central Mutual). Cabaniss filed a claim on Eoffis insurance policy, but the insurer denied coverage based on breach of contract by Eoff and because the vehicle Eoff was driving was not

KHOUZAM, Judge, Dissenting. I would affirm. This is a case of first impression in Florida,9 and I believe that under the unique facts of this case the trial court correctly determined that Smith was entitled to coverage under the UM portion of his policy. The majority holds that Smith should be denied coverage because the policy unambiguously states that an “uninsured motor vehicle” ca

OPINION AND ORDER GEORGE C. SMITH, District Judge. This matter is before the Court pursuant to the motion filed by the defendants on October 17, 1988 for summary judgment pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Plaintiff, Janice E. Castle, initiated this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, on January 15, 1987. Plaintiff further seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985, 1986, and 1988. For the