Cases

ORDER WILLIAM C. LEE, Chief Judge. This matter is before the court on a “Motion to dismiss Plaintiffs Complaint or for Summary Judgment” filed by the defendants (collectively the “United States”), on June 21, 1996. The parties completed briefing the motion on December 2,1996. For the following reasons, the United States’ motion will be granted. Discussion

Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari denied.

Sup. Ct. Ariz. Certiorari denied.

Yarbrough, Judge. {¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Joseph Richcreek, appeals his conviction and sentence on five counts of rape. The victims are Richcreek’s twin half-sisters (identified herein as “A.M.” and “A.L.”). The alleged rapes occurred at a home that the sisters share with their stepfather, mother, and Richcreek in Perrysburg Township. {¶ 2} In March 2009, the Wood County Grand Jury first indicted Richcre

187 Ariz. 501 (1997) 930 P.2d 1304 STATE of Arizona, Appellee, v. Daniel RICHCREEK, Appellant. No. CR-96-0224-PR. Supreme Court of Arizona, En Banc. January 21, 1997. *502 Grant Woods, Arizona Attorney General by Paul J. McMurdie, Consuelo M. Ohanesian, Phoenix, for State of Arizona. Dean W. Trebesc

OPINION GERBER, Judge. Appellant Daniel Charles Richcreek (Rich-creek) appeals his conviction for one count of theft, a class 4 nondangerous felony. The sole issue before us is whether the trial court erred when it refused to suppress all evidence against him. For reasons that follow, we affirm. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY According to the record, the relevant facts ar

796 F.2d 477 Richcreekv.Crecu 85-1437, 85-2586 United States Court of Appeals,Seventh Circuit. 7/7/86 1 S.D.Ind. AFFIRMED

612 F.Supp. 111 (1985) Michael A. RICHCREEK v. George GRECU, et al. Nos. IP 84-710-C, IP 84-779-C and IP 84-1686-C. United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division. June 17, 1985. *112 *113 Michael A. Richcreek, pro se. Peter Sklarew, Trial Atty., Tax Div., Dept. of Ju

812 F.2d 1410 Richcreekv.C.I.R. 85-2959, 85-2960 United States Court of Appeals,Seventh Circuit. 1/30/87 1 U.S.T.C. AFFIRMED

860 F.Supp. 788 (1994) Liane B. FOUTZ, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant. Civ. No. 93-C-1011W. United States District Court, for D. Utah, Central Division. June 13, 1994. *789 Barrie G. McKay, McKay, Burton & Thurman, Salt Lake City, UT, for plaintiff. Kirk C. Lusty, Sp. Asst. U.S. Atty., Dept. of Justi

840 F.Supp. 641 (1993) Harry C. KAUFMANN; Eileen M. Kaufmann; Harry Kaufmann Motor Cars, Inc.; and Kaufmann-Campbell Leasing, Inc., Plaintiffs, v. The UNITED STATES of America; Neil Saari, personally and in his official capacity; John T. Ader, personally and in his official capacity; Michael J. Murphy, personally and in his official capacity; Larry Kaiser, personally and in his official capacity; Peter K. Nunez, personally and in his official cap

Appeal from an interlocutory order appointing a receiver of a fund of $10,408.49 deposited by the "Texas Racing Commission" in the "suspense cash account" of the State Treasury under R.C.S. Art. 4388, Vernon's Ann.Civ.St. art. 4388, and ordering the Treasurer and Comptroller to issue a warrant for said sum payable to the receiver. The order also directs the State Tax Commissioner as custodian of the records of the Racing Commission to deliver such records to the receiver. The appeal is by the

Mr. Justice Riess delivered the opinion of the court. In this suit, the Pacific States Life Insurance Company, a corporation, and Henry GL Miller, its ancillary receiver, appellees herein, filed a hill in chancery in the circuit court of Vermilion county to foreclose a mortgage executed on March 13, 1923, by J. C. McKibben and Sadie J. McKibben, his wife, on rea

110 B.R. 951 (1990) In re Willis E. HARTMAN, Debtor. Willis E. HARTMAN, Plaintiff, v. UNITED STATES of America, Internal Revenue Service, the State of Kansas, and Kansas Department of Revenue, Defendants. Bankruptcy No. 87-11805, Adv. No. 88-0164, No. 89-1264-C. United States District Court, D. Kansas. February 14, 1990. *952

PER CURIAM. In 1983, plaintiffs Susan Kelly and James Kelly each filed with the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) a “Request for Refund of Income Tax”, seeking a refund of all taxes paid in taxable year 1982. Each plaintiff stated that he was a “natural indi- , vidual” and “unenfranchised freeman” who “neither requested, obtained, nor

PER CURIAM. Grant Sullivan filed suit in district court against the United States, seeking a refund of his partial payment of a civil penalty that the Internal Revenue Service ■ (IRS) assessed against him, and a determination that the penalty should not have been assessed. The district court dismissed his complaint for failure to stat

Montgomery, J. Appellee was charged by affidavit with having transacted a banking business on July 3, 1905, and for two days prior thereto, and with having used the words “bank,” “banker,” and “banking” in connection with said business without having filed with the Auditor of State a detailed statement under oath as required by the act of March 4, 1905 (Acts 1905, p. 182, §§2994a-2994j Burns 1905), entitled: “An act to regulate

OPINION OF THE COURT WATKINS, Judge: In accordance with his pleas, appellant was convicted of two specifications of conspiracy to commit larceny, one specification of burglary, and two specifications of larce*667ny of items of a value in excess of $100.00.1 He was sentenced to a dishonorable discharge, confinement at ha

121 B.R. 249 (1990) In re William and Mattie OLDFIELD. William and Mattie OLDFIELD, Plaintiffs, v. UNITED STATES of America, INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE, Defendant. Bankruptcy No. 89-41501 S, Adv. No. 90-4032. United States Bankruptcy Court, E.D. Arkansas, Little Rock Division. October 22, 1990. *250 Mark Colbert, Davidson Law F

Williams, J., ' The plaintiff’s right of recovery was based upon the alleged fraud in the sale and assignment of the lease, and the defendants’ obligation guaranteeing its validity and operative effect; and the part of the charge held by the circuit court to be erroneous, is that by which the jury were instructed that if they- should find, on either ground, for the plaintiff, he was entitled to recover the amount paid for the leas