Cases

Garry, J. Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Reynolds-Fitzgerald, J.), entered September 16, 2016 in Broome County, ordering, among other things, equitable distribution of the parties’ marital property, upon a decision of the court. Plaintiff (hereinafter the wife) and defendant (hereinafter the

Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: Joel Vicars appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment to the Defendants on his complaint asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc to 2000cc-5 (2012). We have rev

*791Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion. Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: Colly Cascen appeals the district court’s order granting summary judgment to the Defendants on his complaint asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Perso

CLARK, J. b The instant case presents a claim under the Louisiana Products Liability Act (“LPLA”). We granted its companion case to determine the viability of negligent spoliation of evidence as a cause of action in Louisiana.1 We now address the underlying products liability case and review the appropriateness of the lower' court’s grant of summary judgment. For the reasons expressed below, we a

CRICHTON, J., additionally concurs and assigns reasons. hi agree completely with the majority decision and join in both its reasoning and result. I write separately to emphasize that this Court’s recognition of a negligent spoliation tort would create significant, and unnecessary, burdens on the legal system. Permitting parties to bring negligent spoliation claims would “inundate our justice system” with der

617 So.2d 402 (1993) DEAN WITTER REYNOLDS, INC., Alfred L. Caliendo, Bruce P. Cotten and Timothy P. Maloney, Appellants, v. George C. CLARKE, III, Individually and/or as Trustee UTA DTD 12/23/83, Appellee. No. 92-2301. District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District. April 20, 1993. Broome, Kelley, Aldrich & Warren, and Randy D. Ellison; Morgan, Lewis, Bocki

MCFADDEN, Judge. This appeal and cross-appeal are from a trial court’s award of attorney fees pursuant to OCGA § 9-15-14. But because the trial court’s order fails to specify whether the award was made under subsection (a) or (b) of the statute and the specific conduct upon which the award was based, and because the evidence as to the actual costs and reasonableness of those costs was lacking, we vacate the order and remand

Clark, J. Appeal from an order and judgment of the Supreme Court (Fisher, J.), entered September 11, 2015 in Greene County, which granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint. Pursuant to a contract dated December 23, 2011, defendant hired plaintiff as an independent contractor to operate its wastewater treatment facility. In March

GROSS, J. The trial below was a tale of two former lovers — Monica Lopez and John Clarke— regarding who infected the other with the genital herpes ■virus. Both denied having the virus prior to their relationship. . Both said they were faithful to each other. Both suffered genital herpes outbreaks— Lopez in February, 2005 and Clarke a few months later. Lopez sued Clarke and the c

Bilbrey, J., concurring. I concur in the majority opinion. I agree with the logic of Arena Parking, Inc. v. Lon Worth Crow Insurance Agency , 768 So.2d 1107 (Fla. 3d DCA 2000), and Shaw v. State ex rel. Butterworth ,

Denied.

BENTON, J. Defendants in a wrongful death action below, the tobacco companies who are now appealing, refused Erskin Ward’s offers of judgment, only to lose at trial and suffer entry of judgment in the wrongful death case awarding sums dramatically in excess of what Mr. Ward had been willing to settle for. As the prevailing party, he filed a timely motion to tax attorney’s fees and costs pursuant to the offer of judgment statut

TAYLOR, J, dissenting. I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision reversing the final judgment for the plaintiff. Although I agree that many of the comments-made by plaintiffs counsel were improper, I would find no abuse of discretion in the trial court’s ruling that they did not constitute a sufficient basis- for a mistrial. I would therefore affirm the trial court’s decision on this issue.

SHARON G. LEE, J., dissenting. I agree with the Court’s conclusion that the warrantless blood draw violated Ms. Reynolds’ right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, -as guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and article I, section 7 of the Tennessee Constitution. I dissent from the Court’s decision to excuse these constitutional violations by adopting a good-faith exc

{¶ 1} This appeal is taken from a judgment and order of the domestic relations division of the court of common pleas, enforcing a grandmother's right of visitation. {¶ 2} The marriage of Joseph and Katherine Spicer was terminated on January 27, 1997, by a decree of dissolution granted by the Circuit Court of Jennings *Page 487 County, Indiana. Custody of the parties' minor child, Justice, was awarded to

PER CURIAM. This case is controlled by Roden v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 145 So.3d 183 (Fla. 4th DCA 2014), decided after the trial court’s ruling. The trial court erred by not allowing the personal representative to amend the complaint and in dismissing the action on statute of limitation grounds. Reversed. GROSS and DAMOORGIAN, JJ., and HERSCH, RICHARD, Associ

PER CURIAM. Petitioner seeks a writ of prohibition to review the denial of her motion to disqualify the trial judge. This is an Engle-progeny1 case with the basis for the motion to disqualify arising after the trial and verdict. We grant the petition. Petitioner has demonstrated that she has an objectively reasonable basis to fear that she will not receive fair review of the pending post-t

PER CURIAM. DENIED. Petitioner seeks certiorari review of the circuit court’s August 19, 20Í4, Order Denying Defendant R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company’s Motion to Quash Subpoena of Dr. James N. Figlar. Although the ruling is now moot, we address the petition because it involves an issue that is capable of repetition yet evading review. See Kelley v. Rice, 800 So.2d 247 (Fla. 2d DCA 2001). We conclude, however, that pe

PER CURIAM. AFFIRMED. See Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Douglas, 110 So.3d 419 (Fla.2013); see also Walker v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 734 F.3d 1278 (11th Cir.2013). LEWIS, C.J., CLARK and MARSTILLER, JJ., concur.

BENTON, J. As personal representative of the estate of Lennette Gaff, as surviving spouse of Lennette Gaff, and on behalf of Ms. Gaffs surviving child, Wilmer Gaff asks us to overturn summary final judgment entered against him on grounds the statute of limitations bars wrongful death claims against R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, Philip Morris USA, Inc., Lorillard Tobacco Company, Lorillard, Inc., Liggett Group, LLC, and Ve