Cases

*177DISSENTING OPINION BY ORIE MELVIN, J.: ¶ 1 I respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision to reverse the judgment in favor of Appellees. I further disagree with the majority’s assessment that prior decisions addressing the use of the “error of judgment” instruction are “irreconcilable.” Rather, I find that this Court conducted the inquiry require

OPINION DENNIS M. CAVANAUGH, District Judge. This matter comes before the Court upon motions by Defendants Robin S. Weingast & Associates, Inc. and Robin S. Weingast (collectively the “Weingast Defendants”)(ECF No. 24), Defendant Designs for Finance, Inc. (“Designs”)(ECF No. 27), Defendant Pointe Benefit Consultants, LLC (“Pointe Benefit”)(ECF No. 29), and Defendant Capital One, N.A. (“Capitol One”)(ECF

*589Order, Supreme Court, New York County (Elliott Wilk, J.), entered November 7, 1997, which denied defendant’s motion for summary judgment dismissing plaintiffs third and fourth causes of action for legal malpractice, unanimously reversed, on the law, without costs, the motion granted, and the third and fourth causes of action dismissed. Plaintiffs amended complaint states two

Smith, Judge. Alan Rapaport appeals from an order finding him in contempt of a consent order and ordering him to pay attorney fees. He contends the trial court erred in holding him in contempt and in imposing a sanction not permitted by law. We conclude that the trial court did not err in finding Rapaport in contempt, but that payment of attorney fees is not a permissible sanction in a criminal contempt action. We therefore af

682 So.2d 1149 (1996) THE JEWISH FEDERATION OF PALM BEACH COUNTY, INC., Appellant, v. Robert D. RAPAPORT, Appellee. No. 95-4060. District Court of Appeal of Florida, Fourth District. October 16, 1996. Rehearing and Rehearing Denied November 25, 1996. *1150 Marshall J. Osofsky of Lewis, Vegosen, Rosenbach & Si

SAUFLEY, C.J. [¶ 1] The City of Brewer appeals from a partial summary judgment and subsequent final judgment of the Superior Court (Pe-nobscot County, Hjelm, J.) awarding damages to the J.A. Rapaport Family Limited Partnership (the Rapaports) in compensation for the City’s taking of a part of the Rapaports’ property by eminent domain. According to the City, the court should have allowed it to reduce the compensati

NARICK, Senior Judge. Kathleen Mosser (Mosser) appeals from the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Lehigh County that affirmed in part and reversed in part the decision of the Zoning Hearing Board of the City of Allentown (ZHB), and denied Mosser’s application to use the subject property as a playground. We affirm. Mosser entered into an agreement1 to purchase a certain undeve

LANDAU, J. This is an appeal from the trial court’s granting of the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint.1 The plaintiffs claim that the trial court improperly (I) dismissed the complaint as to the named plaintiff, Rapaport and Benedict, P.C. (Rapaport), in that Rapaport’s standing as a tliird party beneficiary provided a direct right of access to the Superior Court, (2) concluded

—■ Defendants (except Fred Harmer) appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County, dated January 5, 1979, which, inter alia, granted plaintiffs’ motion to vacate a stipulation and any orders entered as a result of the stipulation. Order reversed, on the law and the facts, with one bill of costs payable to the appellants appearing separately and filing separate briefs, motion denied, the stipulation and orders of the Supreme Court, Kings Co

Memorandum Accompanying Order Ford, Judge: Plaintiff has moved this court for judgment on the pleadings and defendant has cross-moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. The merchandise involved was entered as parte of motorcycles under item A692.55, Tariff Schedules of the United States, entitled to entry free of duty under the General System of Preferences, inasmuch as the merchandise was manufactu

Joseph F. Hawkins, J. Petitioners, operators of a bar and grill, located in the Village of Port Chester, New York, who are also owners of the real property containing the licensed premises, bring this proceeding pursuant to article 78 of the CPLR: (a) to prohibit the respondents “from illegally proceeding against petitioners under the State 'Standard Building Code For Places Of Public Assembly ”, and (b) reviewing the action of t

ROGERS, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and concurring in the judgment: In rejecting OTS’s contention that the court should defer to its construction of 12 U.S.C. § 1818(b)(6)(A)(i) under Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984), the majority concludes that “[w]e have already held in Wachtel [v. OTS, 982 F.2d 58

495 A.2d 1235 (1985) John DOE v. Richard ROE, Bangor Publishing Company, Intervenor. Supreme Judicial Court of Maine. Argued June 12, 1985. Decided July 23, 1985. *1236 Preti, Flaherty & Beliveau, Daniel Rapaport (orally), Christopher D. Nyhan, Edward R. Benjamin, Jr., Portland, for appellant. Eaton, Peabody, Bradford

OAKES, Circuit Judge: This appeal is by a corporation and its former president from judgments of conviction for tax fraud by means of year-end LIFO (“last-in-first-out”) inventory overstatement. The principal arguments of both defendants before the jury in a trial in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York, Robert L. Carter, Judge, were that the in

Stabke, J. This is a summary proceeding to dispossess a statutory tenant from business space, brought under subdivision 5 of section 1410 of the Civil Practice Act and paragraph (2) of subdivision (b) of section 8 of the Business Bent Law of the State of New York (L. 1945, ch. 314, as amd.). The landlord contends that the leased space is being and has been continuously used and occupied for illegal purposes and for illegal manu

A motion for judgment on the pleadings is in the nature of a demurrer. 1 Bancroft Code Pleading, p. 917, sec. 630; 49 C.J. 668, sec. 945; 21 R.C.L. 594, sec. 142; 21 Cal. Jur. 234, sec. 163, n. 10; 21 Cal. Jur. 240, sec. 166, n. 5. If the answer sets up affirmative matter constituting a defense, a motion for judgment on the pleadings will be denied. 1 Bancroft Code Pleading 925, sec. 637; 21 Cal. Jur. 238, n. 13; Parks v. Western Union, 45 Nev. 411, <

20 Cal.App.2d 271 (1937) MAX RAPAPORT, Appellant, v. EARL FORER et al., Respondents. Civ. No. 5787. California Court of Appeals. Third Appellate District. April 8, 1937. Bertram S. Harris and Joseph Harris Brewer for Appellant. Horowitz & McCloskey for Respondents. Pullen, P. J. By this appeal Max Rapaport, as appellant, is attacking

As to the transcript on appeal, the same was prematurely filed. It was filed while plaintiff's motion to strike the same as a bill of exceptions was pending and undecided in the court below, after the final decision upon which motion plaintiff had, and still has, five days *Page 181 within which to serve and file all other objections which he may have to the allowance and settlement of said bill of exceptions, pursuant to the order of said lower court. Th

This cause is before us upon an appeal from the judgment of the trial court denying the application of the petitioner for a writ of certiorari annulling and setting aside the findings and judgment of the respondents dismissing the petitioner from his position as an assistant physician at the Mendocino State Hospital. The return made by the respondents in this case is exceedingly voluminous, and the brief filed in behalf of the petitioner calls attention to many points of proce

This action was brought to recover damages to an automobile which, the plaintiff claims, were caused after it had been stolen. The defendant denied liability. The cause was tried to the court without a jury, and resulted in findings of fact and conclusions of law sustaining the right of recovery, and a judgment was entered in favor of the plaintiff in the sum of $275. From this judgment the defendant appeals. The facts essential to be stated, for the purpose of presenting the controlli