Cases

520 F.3d 384 (2008) UNITED STATES of America, ex rel., Robert Daniel MARCY, on behalf of the United States of America, c/o James Letten & John Ashcroft, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROWAN COMPANIES, INC.; Newfield Exploration Gulf Coast, Inc., formerly known as EEX Corporation; Newfield Exploration Co.; Remington Oil & Gas Corp., Defendants-Appellees. No. 06-31238. United States Court of Appeals, Fi

PRECEDENTIAL UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ______________ No. 20-1977 ______________ JOSEPH D. MARCY, Appellant v. SUPERINTENDENT PHOENIX SCI; THE DISTRICT ATTORNEY OF THE COUNTY OF LUZERNE; THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA On Appeal from the U

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE SEPTEMBER 13, 2007 Session ANTHONY JOSEPH ZIOBROWSKI v. MARCY HAYS ZIOBROWSKI Direct Appeal from the Circuit Court for Williamson County No. 95160 Russ Heldman, Judge No. M2006-02359-COA-R3-CV - Filed December 20, 2007 This appeal involves a final decree of divorce that was entered in 1995, and a p

WILLIAMS, J. liThe plaintiffs, Rochundra Garrison and Sam Winston, Jr., appeal a summary judgment in favor of defendants, State Farm Fire and Casualty Company and Duane Lucky, Jr. The district court also granted State Farm’s exception of.no right of action against Garrison and denied the insurer’s motion to strike an affidavit. For the following reasons, we reverse in part and remand. FACTS

ON MOTION FOR REHEARING AND CLARIFICATION SHAHOOD, J. We grant appellee’s Motion for Rehearing and Clarification, withdraw our opinion filed January 5, 2000, and substitute the following opinion in its place. We affirm appellant’s revocation of probation. The fact that the misdemeanor charge of possession of cannabis was dismissed by the county court is of no consequence bec

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT NASHVILLE August 8, 2002 Session MARCIE D. ALLEN, ET AL. v. RASHID AL-QADIR, ET AL. A Direct Appeal from the Chancery Court for Williamson County No. I-26697 The Honorable R. E. Lee Davies, Chancellor No. M2001-03009-COA-R3-CV - Filed October 24, 2002 This is an appeal from an Order entered on a ju

PER CURIAM. This is an appeal from a conviction for possession of cocaine (Count I) and possession of paraphernalia (Count II), from the scoring for the sentence imposed as to Count I and from the assessment of a special public defender fee. We affirm the conviction and sentence for possession of cocaine, reverse the conviction and sentence for possession of paraphernalia with direction to vacate same, and reverse the specia

PER CURIAM. Affirmed. We agree with the state that the trial court did not err in refusing to give an instruction on self-defense when there was no evidence presented to support such an instruction. Neither of the versions of the underlying incident in question presented by the parties included evidence of self-defense. We also agree that reversible error *1254has

HARRISON, Judge Pro Tem. _JiThis case involves a death that allegedly arose from a physical altercation in a bar parking lot. The decedent’s mother sued the bar and its insurer. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the bar’s insurer, dismissing it from the suit on the basis that coverage was excluded under its policy’s assault and battery clause. The decedent’s mother appeals. We affirm. FAC

PER CURIAM. Appellant appeals from an adjudication of delinquency for burglary of a conveyance and grand theft. The trial court placed her in a community control program. A special condition of community control required that appellant wear an electronic monitoring device. At trial, a police officer testified that when he arrived at the crime scene, a parking lot, he found “a stolen vehicle left” and t

PER CURIAM. We affirm the trial court’s revocation of appellant’s probation. Based on appellee’s concession of error, we remand to the trial court to conform the written order of probation with the oral pronouncement. See Harrington v. State, 570 So.2d 1140 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). Affirmed; remanded for resentencing. KLEIN, SHAHOOD and GROSS, JJ., concur.

PER CURIAM. We affirm as to all issues except the issue of appellant’s conviction and sentence for armed home invasion robbery, which was contrary to the trial court’s oral pronouncement of judgment and sentence. See Tannihill v. State, 559 So.2d 608 (Fla. 4th DCA 1990). We therefore reverse appellant’s conviction and vacate his sentence as to count I, armed home invasion robbery. However, remand for resentencing is

PER CURIAM. We reverse the portion of Appellant’s probation order which provides that Appellant may perform community service in lieu of paying the costs of supervision required by section 948.09, Florida Statutes (1994). See Royster v. State, 657 So.2d 36 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). It is also clear from the face of section 948.09(3) that any authority to exempt an individual from paying all or part of his cost of supervi

ANSTEAD, Judge, concurring specially. I agree that appellant’s habitual offender sentence should be affirmed. The record before us reflects that the appellant entered into a plea bargain which included adjudication as a habitual offender. Hence, appellant has waived any procedural defects. See Jefferson v. State 571 So.2d 70 (Fla. 1st DCA 1990); see also Judge v. State, 596 So.2d 73 (Fla. 2d DC

PER CURIAM. Appellant’s sentence to six years in prison, in case no. 93-462, exceeds the guidelines-permitted range of two and one-half to five and one-half years incarceration. At sentencing, the court and all the parties were under the mistaken impression that the range under the scoresheet was three and one-half to seven years. Although Appellant acknowledged at sentencing that he was facing a potentia

PER CURIAM: * The court has carefully considered the briefs, oral argument, and pertinent portions of the record. After such review, we have determined that the judgment of the district court should be affirmed for essentially the reasons set forth by the district court. Boutari v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., No. 5:09-cv-00608, doc. 88 (W.D. Tex. June 10, 2010) (Order Accepting Report an

PER CURIAM. The state appeals a downward departure sentence entered without providing written reasons therefor. We reverse based on Ree v. State, 565 So.2d 1329 (Fla.1990). Upon remand, the court must resentence appellant with no possibility for departure from the guidelines. Pope v. State, 561 So.2d 554 (Fla.1990). However, recognizing that there remains a question of whether Pope has retroactive

LUCERO, Circuit Judge. This diversity case has been through two jury trials and is again before us on appeal. Some two years ago, this court considered the case and reversed the trial court’s grant of partial summary judgment as to the plaintiffs’ breach of contract claim. At a subsequent trial, judgment was entered for the plaintiffs, and the defendant, Kerr-McGee Coal Corpor

DOWNEY, Judge. In June, 1983, appellant was placed on five years’ probation for dealing in stolen property. Some three and one-half years later, appellant was charged with violating his probation by failing to live and remain at liberty without violating any law in that he was arrested in Ohio for unlawful possession of dangerous ordinance and arrested for domestic violence. Appellant was convicted of both of said offenses

552 P.2d 20 (1976) The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Marcl McCAIN, Defendant-Appellant. No. 26415. Supreme Court of Colorado, In Department. July 6, 1976. Rehearing Denied August 3, 1976. John P. Moore, Atty. Gen., John E. Bush, Deputy Atty. Gen., Donna A. Maranchik, David W. Rees, Asst. Attys. Gen., Denver, for plaintiff-a