Cases

Johnson, J.: dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the major- ity’s determination that all of Sharp’s statements were the product of her free and independent will. The majority emphasizes that we are to afford great deference to the district court’s factual findings. However, I do not discern that the facts are really in dispute; we know precisely what was said and how it was said. I can even

EDITH H. JONES, Chief Judge: Appellants G.H. Leidenheimer Baking Company, Ltd. (“Leidenheimer”) and Patton Sausage Company (“Patton”) bring this consolidated appeal, challenging the lower courts’ treatment of preference payments each received from a grocery store chain before it filed bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b). Because none of the payments at issue

*1325 LOURIE, Circuit Judge. DECISION Pamela J. Sharp appeals from the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (the “Veterans Court”) affirming the Board of Veterans’ Appeals’ denial of her claim for accrued benefits. Sharp v. Principi, </

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit 04-7111 PAMELA J. SHARP, Claimant-Appellant, v. R. JAMES NICHOLSON, Secretary of Veterans Affairs, Respondent-Appellee. Sandra E. Booth, of Columbus, Ohio, argued for cl

In a negligence action to recover damages for personal injury of a minor child and for loss of services and medical expenses of the child’s father, defendant appeals from a judgment of the Supreme Court, Kings County, entered February 17, 1969 in favor of plaintiffs, upon a jury verdict. Judgment reversed, on the law, and new trial granted in the interests of justice, with costs to abide the event. The findings of fact are affirmed. In our opinion this was

Per Curiam. {¶ 1} Respondent, Kim Gerette Martorana, of Auburn Township, Ohio, Attorney Registration No. 0060109, was admitted to the practice of law in Ohio in 1992. In an 11-count first amended complaint, relator, Geauga County Bar Association, alleged that Martorana violated five Rules of .Professional Conduct as a result of her

MEMORANDUM KEVIN H. SHARP, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE Pending before the Court is Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment (Docket Entry No. 64). The motion has been fully briefed by the parties.1 RELEVANT FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY During the 2010 crop year, Plaintiffs were in the business of raising burley tobacco in Macon Co

SHARP, W, J., Aguirre appeals from the circuit court’s order summarily denying his motion filed pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.800(a), seeking post-conviction relief. The appeal was filed more than thirty days after rendition of the order sought to be appealed and Aguirre failed to respond to this court’s order to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. See Fla.

SHARP, Judge. Moore appeals his conviction of robbery with a firearm. He argues the trial court erred in limiting the cross-examination of two prosecution witnesses, Mainor and Thompson; in denying his presentation of collateral witnesses to impeach the two witnesses’ identification of Moore as a perpetrator of the criminal acts charged; and in curtailing defense counsel’s closing argument to the jury that a police officer p

SAWAYA, C.J. Jamie Hawkins and co-defendant Candy Lovell were tried together for the death of Lovell’s daughter. Both defendants appealed and, represented by the same appellate counsel, raised identical issues: (1) that it was reversible error for the trial court to fail to read the definitions of excusable and justifiable homicide, and (2) that the convictions and sentences for both first-degree murder and aggravated mans

ORDER MIRANDA M. DU, District Judge. I. SUMMARY This appeal involves the question of whether reliance or reasonable expectation *628of payment from an alter ego at the time of the transaction is a necessary requirement for application of the alter ego doctrine under Nevada law. The Court finds that such a showing is not required

PLEUS, J. Appellant, Jamie Dearing, appeals a final summary judgment in favor of appel-lee, General Motors Acceptance Corporation [GMAC]. We reverse. This case arose when Dearing sued GMAC, Jason Redditt, Robert Redditt and John Hodak following a car accident in which she was seriously injured. Dearing alleged in her third amended complaint that she was a rear seat passenger in a 1999 GMC Suburban driven

Elaine E. Bucklo, United States District Judge In this qui tam action, plaintiff-relator Crystal Derrick ("relator") sues her former employer Roche Diagnostics Corporation, and its affiliate Roche Diabetics Care, Inc., (collectively "Roche" or the "Roche defendants"),1 along with Humana, Inc., and Humana Pharmacy, Inc., (collectively "Humana" or the "Humana defendants"), alleging that they viol

ANTOON, Judge. The personal representative of the Estate of Larry Long (Long) appeals the trial court’s order entering summary final judgment in favor of Prudential Property and Casualty Insurance (Prudéntial). The order determined that Prudential’s automobile insurance contract with Long did riot include uninsured motorist coverage. We affirm- because the uneontroverted facts demonstrate that Long knowingly rejected uninsur

OPINION HERLIHY, J. In circumstances novel to Delaware law, the motion before the Court puts in clear focus two significant but conflicting principles of public policy. One principle is the encouragement of the reporting of suspected child abuse and immunity from liability of those making such reports. The other is the right of redress, if any, of persons falsely accused of child abuse.

894 P.2d 415 (1994) Jeffrey T. JONES, Respondent, v. OKLAHOMA NATURAL GAS COMPANY, a trade name for Oneok, Inc., Petitioner. No. 80574. Supreme Court of Oklahoma. July 12, 1994. Jack S. Dawson, Kelly A. George, and Jami J. Campisano, Miller, Dollarhide, Dawson & Shaw, Oklahoma City, for respondent. D. Lynn Babb, G. Calvin Sharpe, Pierce, Couch, Hendrickso

Saad, J. I. NATURE OP THE CASE The narrow but consequential legal question posed by this appeal is whether defendants-appellants, Henry Ford Health System and Henry Ford Macomb Hospital Corporation (collectively, Henry Ford, the hospital, or defendants), are liable for defendant Dr. John J. Lim’s alleged malpractice in his treatment of plaintiff, Jamie Laster,

Egan Jr., J. Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Ellis, J.), entered September 8, 2014 in Clinton County, which denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability. At approximately 12:00 p.m. on the afternoon of Saturday, January 15, 2011, defendant Jamie F. Menard, a refrigeration technician, drove the Ford Econoline van owned by his employer, defendant L. Bombardier and Sons, In

Egan Jr., J. Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court (Ellis, J.), entered September 8, 2014 in Clinton County, which denied plaintiff’s motion for summary judgment on the issue of liability. At approximately 12:00 p.m. on the afternoon of Saturday, January 15, 2011, defendant Jamie F. Menard, a refrigeration technician, drove the Ford Econoline van owned by his employer, defendant L. Bombardier and Sons, In

This is an equitable conversion case. Dissatisfied with a judgment favorable to the heir of the personalty, the heir of one-half of the realty advances two points of trial court error. We affirm. Shawna Wolfe, now deceased, and her sister, appellant Mellane A. Parson, contracted on September 17, 1981, to sell 160 acres of their separate realty in Floyd County to their paternal uncle. Before the *Page 691 sale could be closed Mrs. Wolfe died