Cases

14‐2378‐cr United States v. Suarez In the United States Court of Appeals For the Second Circuit ________ August Term, 2014 No. 14‐2378‐cr UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appellee, v. YESID RIOS SUAREZ, A

SUMMARY ORDER Yesid Rios Suarez appeals from a judgment of conviction entered on June 30, 2014, in the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York (Forrest, J.), following Suarez’s guilty plea. We assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts, procedural history, and issues for review. We review the district court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo, see United

PER CURIAM. Affirmed. DelMonico v. Traynor, 116 So.3d 1205, 1212 (Fla.2013); Fink v. Oshins, P.3d 640, 644 (Nev.2002); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 587 (1977).

An Appeal from the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, David C. Miller, Judge. Before RAMIREZ, C.J., and SUAREZ and CORTIÑAS, JJ. Affirmed. See Major v. State, 814 So.2d 424 (Fla.2002); Gaber v. State, 684 So.2d 189 (Fla.1996).

25 So.3d 1250 (2010) Jimmie JACOBS, Appellant, v. The STATE of Florida, Appellee. No. 3D09-515. District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District. January 20, 2010. Jimmie Jacobs, in proper person. Bill McCollum, Attorney General, and Magaly Rodriguez, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee. Before RAMIREZ, C.J., and SUAREZ and CORTIÑAS, JJ.

PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See § 194.171(2), (6), Fla. Stat. (2005).

PER CURIAM. Affirmed. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d *431674 (1984); Herring v. State, 730 So.2d 1264 (Fla.1998).

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. ARTURO JUAREZ SUAREZ, Defendant and Appellant. S105876 Napa County Superior Court CR103779 August 13, 2020 Justice Liu authored the opinion of the Court, in which Chief Justice Cantil-Sakauye and

Before KISOR, BROWN, and MIZER Appellate Military Judges _________________________ UNITED STATES Appellee v. Carter J. JACOBS Lance Corporal (E-3), U.S. Marine Corps Appellant

ORDER THOMAS N. O’NEILL, JR., District Judge. AND NOW, this 8th day of May, 2013, upon consideration of Magistrate Hart’s Report and Recommendation (Dkt. No. 14), plaintiff Luz Suarez’s Objections to the Report and Recommendation (Dkt. No. 15), defendant Michael Astrue’s response thereto (Dkt. No. 16) and the well-developed record, it is ORDERED that: 1. Plaintiffs Obje

ACCEPTED 07-17-00047-CR SEVENTH COURT OF APPEALS AMARILLO, TEXAS 8/2/2017 3:07 PM

In an action to recover damages for personal injuries, the defendant A. Mario Elvin Suarez appeals, as limited by his brief, from so much of an order of the Supreme Court, Kings County (Velasquez, J.), dated June 18, 2009, as denied his motion for summary judgment dismissing the complaint insofar as asserted against him on the ground that the plaintiff did not sustain a serious injury within the meaning of Insurance Law § 5102 (d), and the defendants City

PER CURIAM. It is undisputed that insurer notified insured, by actual notice to insured’s agent, that insured’s policy was about to be can-celled unless insured timely made a missed payment. With several weeks to act, insured nonetheless failed to meet the payment deadline which would have secured coverage. A fire then occurred on insured’s premises. Under these circumstances, we conclude insurer’s actions were not the cau

EMAS, J. This is an appeal from an order of the trial court dismissing with prejudice Appellants’ second amended complaint, based upon a finding that Appellants perpetrated a fraud upon the court. For the following reasons, we reverse. Appellants, Jose Suarez and Anais Suarez, filed a complaint (subsequently amended twice) against Benihana National of Florida Corporation (“Benihana”) seeking damages for s

METZNER, District Judge. The United States of America has moved for reargument of the granting of the motion by defendants Sprotzer and Berlind to strike the cross-complaint of the government. The motion for re-argument is granted and on reargument the original determination is adhered to with a modification of the fifth paragraph of the original memorandum. The memorandum as modified reads as follows: “This

LAVERY, J., dissenting. I respectfully dissent from part II of the majority opinion. It is undisputed that a trial court may grant a summary judgment where, under applicable principles of substantive law, the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Suarez v. Dickmont Plastics Corp., 229 Conn. 99, 105, 639 A.2d 507 (1994). The majority, however, cites no substantive applicable law, statutory or co

—Order and judgment (one paper), Supreme Court, New York County (Phyllis Gangel-Jacob, J.), entered August 11, 1998, which confirmed the report of the Special Referee, granted defendant’s motion for summary judgment and dismissed the complaint, unanimously affirmed, without costs. We agree with the motion court that the record provides no basis for plaintiffs claim that he was dismissed by respondent in retaliation for activities protected

NUMBER 13-25-00266-CV COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG MELDEN & HUNT, INC., Appellant, v. DEANIRA CANTU, PABLO RUBALCABA, DOMINGO PENA JR., JANET PENA, MONICA CAVAZOS, JUANITA “JANIE” AND ROMAN RODRIGUEZ, FELICITAS AND JOSE GARZA, NORMA SUAREZ, CASSANDRA AYALA, GERARDITA GARZA, BENITO HUERTA, MAGDALENA RODRIGUEZ, EVANGELINA AND ROGELIO

*********************************************** The “officially released” date that appears near the be- ginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be pub- lished in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the be- ginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. All opinions are subject to modification and technical corr

************************************************ The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopin- ion motions and petitions for certification is the “offi- cially released” date appearing in the opinion. All opinions are subject to modification and technical cor