Cases

************************************************ The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopin- ion motions and petitions for certification is the “offi- cially released” date appearing in the opinion. All opinions are subject to modification and technical cor

RESCRIPT We affirmed Colon's convictions, as well as the denial of his first motion for a new trial, after plenary review in 2007. Commonwealth v. Colon , 449 Mass. 207 ,

************************************************ The “officially released” date that appears near the beginning of an opinion is the date the opinion will be published in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it is released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the beginning of all time periods for the filing of postopin- ion motions and petitions for certification is the “offi- cially released” date appearing in the opinion. All opinions are subject to modification and technical cor

[Cite as State v. Colon, 2024-Ohio-4488.] COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA STATE OF OHIO, : Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 113468 v. : EDILBERTO COLON, III, :

[Cite as State v. Colon, 2022-Ohio-2137.] COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA STATE OF OHIO, : Plaintiff-Appellee, : No. 110931 v. : SELENA COLON, :

*********************************************** The “officially released” date that appears near the be- ginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be pub- lished in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the be- ginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. All opinions are subject to modification and technical corr

MEMORANDUM OPINION Deborah L. Thorne, United States Bankruptcy Judge This matter is before the court on the Motion to Dismiss Case for Unreasonable Delay (the “Motion”) filed by the Trustee Marilyn O. Marshall (the “Trustee”) on March 23, 2016 against Iris V. Colon (the “Debtor”). (Dkt. No. 26). In the Motion, the Trustee asks the court to dismiss the Debtor’s bankruptcy case for a series of errors made b

Justice Goldberg, for the Court. This case came before the Supreme Court on November 8, 2018, on appeal by the defendant, Jose Colon (defendant), from a judgment of conviction entered in the Superior Court following a jury trial at which he was found guilty of one count of first-degree child molestation sexual assault. Before this Court, defendant argues that the S

Motion for leave to appeal denied.

Scudder, Circuit Judge. Geraldo Colon used his Indianapolis furniture store and a related business as a front to hide his more lucrative enterprise: buying large quantities of cocaine and heroin from Arizona and reselling the drugs to local dealers in Indiana. For his role as a middleman in this scheme, a grand jury charged Colon with drug conspiracy, money laundering, and making false statements in a bankruptcy proceeding. Followin

[Cite as State v. Colon, 2018-Ohio-1507.] Court of Appeals of Ohio EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION No. 106031 STATE OF OHIO PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

PATRICIA ANN BLACKMON, J.: {¶ 1} Julio Colon ("Colon") appeals from the order of the trial court denying his motion to vacate his guilty plea to three counts of sexual battery. 1 He assigns the following error for our review: The trial court erred by denying [Colon's] motion to

KAYATTA, Circuit Judge. Edgar Reyes-Colon ("Reyes-Colon"), a licensed plastic surgeon specializing in facial cosmetic surgery, allegedly failed to repay certain debts. In November 2006, one of his creditors, Banco Popular de Puerto Rico ("Banco Popular"), filed an involuntary bankruptcy petition that a second creditor, Popular Auto (collectively, "the Banks"), joined. Under

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Oneida County (Joseph E. Fahey, A.J.), entered February 6, 2015 in a proceeding pursuant to Mental *1669Hygiene Law article 10. The order, among other things, continued the commitment of petitioner to a secure treatment facility. It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

Appeal from an order of the Supreme Court, Oneida County (Joseph E. Fahey, A.J.), entered February 6, 2015 in a proceeding pursuant to Mental *1669Hygiene Law article 10. The order, among other things, continued the commitment of petitioner to a secure treatment facility. It is hereby ordered that the order so appealed from is unanimously affirmed without costs.

*********************************************** The “officially released” date that appears near the be- ginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be pub- lished in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the be- ginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. All opinions are subject to modification and technical corr

In a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 6, the father appeals from an order of the Family Court, Westchester County (Schauer, J.), dated July 19, 2012, which, without a hearing, denied his petition for visitation with the subject children. Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements. Contrary to the father’s contention, the Family Court properly denied his petition for visitation w

Order, Family Court, Bronx County (James E. d’Auguste, J.), entered on or about April 11, 2012, which, to the extent appeal-able, after a hearing, found that extraordinary circumstances existed to permit petitioner, the maternal grandmother, to petition for custody of the subject child and to divest respondent father of custody, unanimously affirmed, without costs. Family Court properly determined that the grandmother demonstrated the r

In a proceeding pursuant to Family Court Act article 6, the father appeals from an order of the Family Court, Westchester County (Schauer, J.), dated July 19, 2012, which, without a hearing, denied his petition for visitation with the subject children. Ordered that the order is affirmed, without costs or disbursements. Contrary to the father’s contention, the Family Court properly denied his petition for visitation w

Order, Family Court, Bronx County (James E. d’Auguste, J.), entered on or about April 11, 2012, which, to the extent appeal-able, after a hearing, found that extraordinary circumstances existed to permit petitioner, the maternal grandmother, to petition for custody of the subject child and to divest respondent father of custody, unanimously affirmed, without costs. Family Court properly determined that the grandmother demonstrated the r