Cases

[Cite as State ex rel. Foster v. Brown Cty. Health Dept., 2017-Ohio-8430.] IN THE COURT OF APPEALS TWELFTH APPELLATE DISTRICT OF OHIO BROWN COUNTY STATE OF OHIO EX REL. : ROBERT FOSTER, et al., : CASE NO. CA2016-12-025 Appellants-Relators,

ORDER PER CURIAM. AND NOW, this 23rd day of August, 2012, the Application for Leave to File Original Process is GRANTED, and the Petition for Writ of Mandamus is DENIED. The Prothonotary is directed to strike the name of the jurist from the caption.

FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________ No. 1D18-1855 _____________________________ FOSTER BROWN, Petitioner, v. STATE OF FLORIDA, Respondent. _____________________________ Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus—Original Jurisdiction. August 16, 2018 PER CURIAM. The petition for writ of habeas corpus is

In a proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 to review a determination of the respondent Mary F. Foster, in her capacity as Mayor of the City of Peekskill, dated July 8, 2008, directing the petitioner to refrain from exercising the duties and responsibilities of the offices of Commissioner and Chairperson of the City of Peekskill Housing Authority Board on the ground that certificates of her appointment to those offices had not been filed with the Commissi

15 N.Y.3d 710 (2010) MATTER OF BROWN v. FOSTER. Motion No: 2010-863 Court of Appeals of New York. October 14, 2010. Motion for leave to appeal Denied.

Deen, Presiding Judge. Corbin v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 117 Ga. App. 823 (162 SE2d 226) offers an excellent compendium of cases citing the general rule that injuries to employees while going to or coming from work are not compensable within the meaning of the Workmen’s Compensation Act, with certain exceptions, one of which is "where an employee is on call and furnishes or is reimbursed for his transportation costs.

This is the second appeal in this case. See Brown v. Foster,777 So.2d 715 (Ala.Civ.App. 2000) (Brown I). In BrownI, Brown appealed from what he contended was the trial court's erroneous denial of a Rule 60(b), Ala.R.Civ.P., motion. This court dismissed the appeal as not from a final judgment, because the record indicated the trial court had not yet ruled on Brown's motion. While that appeal was pending, the trial court ent

Felicia Foster sued Jimmy Brown after they were involved in an automobile accident, which she alleged was caused by his negligence and/or wantonness. She sought compensatory damages and punitive damages. Brown failed to file an answer in response to her complaint, and Foster filed a motion for entry of default, pursuant to Rule 55(a), Ala.R.Civ.P. The trial court granted the motion. After a hearing to determine damages, the trial court entered a default judgment, pursuant to Rule 55(b

Petition Denied and Memorandum Opinion filed October 28, 2021. In The Fourteenth Court of Appeals NO. 14-21-00336-CV ALICE ADRIANNE JARMAN, Appellant V. BELINDA DIANNE JARMAN BROWN COSBY AND CHERYL LYNN JARMAN FOSTER, Appellees On Appeal from the Probate Court No. 4 Harris Co

WAYMOND M. BROWN, Judge | Appellant Tony Foster appeals from his conditional plea of guilty to the charges of possession of methamphetamine with the purpose to deliver and possession of drug paraphernalia. He was sentenced to twenty-five years’ imprisonment. Appellant argues that the court erred in denying his motion to suppress. We affirm.

ADA BROWN JUSTICE, Dissenting Because I conclude that the record of the punishment phase of appellant’s trial is necessary to resolve his appeal, and the absence of any record constitutes a fundamentally unfair proceeding, I respectfully dissent. After the jury found appellant guilty of aggravated sexual assault of a child, the jury was discharged and the trial court proceeded to the punishm

HORTON, J. {¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, Sherrie Foster (n.k.a. Tavtigian), appeals from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas, Division of Domestic Relations, granting the motion of defendant-appellee, Mark A. Foster, to terminate spousal support and denying appellant's motion for expense money. For the reasons which follow, we affirm. I.

Affirmed Concurs Concurs

DREW, J. h Jeremy Dewayne Foster entered pleas of guilty to these crimes: • One count of armed robbery while in possession of a firearm; • Four counts of simple burglary; and • Two counts of simple arson (with damages of over $500 in each case). For these crimes, he received these sentences:</

Opinion Issued July 21, 2005 In The Court of Appeals For The First District of

Opinion issued July 15, 2004 In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas

This is an appeal from the trial court's denial of a motion for a new trial. Helen Louise Brown, the plaintiff, filed a negligence action against Michael Lee Foster, the defendant, seeking damages for injuries which she alleged that she sustained in an automobile accident on or about March 22, 1991. The case was tried before a jury. The jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff and awarded her $2,940 in damages. The plaintiff filed a motion for a new trial, alleg

LOLLEY, J. | defendants, Dr. Ravish Patwardhan (“Dr. Patwardhan”) and Louisiana Medical Mutual Insurance Company (“LAMMI-CO”), appeal separate motions for partial summary judgment granted by the First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo, State of Louisiana, in favor of plaintiff, Kerry Foster. For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment on the issue of liability and reverse the judgment on the issue of statutory d

CHESNUT, District Judge. The question now before the Court presents a point for decision under federal “third-party practice” authorized by rule 14(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., which, so far as I know, has not heretofore been determined by the Court of Appeals for this Circuit or by this District Court. The question arises on a motion by a third-party defendant to dismiss a third-party action brou

WILLIAMS, J. hThe defendant, Dan Eugene Foster, was charged by bill of information with driving while intoxicated (“DWI”), third offense, in violation of LSA-R.S. 14:98(D). The defendant pled guilty as charged and was sentenced to serve five years in prison at hard labor. For the following reasons, we affirm the defendant’s conviction and sentence, and we grant appellate counsel’s motion to withdraw. FACT