Cases

Honorable Diane J. Humetewa, United States District Judge Petitioner Frank Dale McCray has filed a motion for recusal. (Doc. 33.) Respondents take no position on the motion, noting only that the Court denied a similar motion under similar circumstances in Morris v. Ryan , No. CV-17-00926-PHX-DGC. (Doc. 34.) For the reasons set forth below, the Court will deny the motion. I. Background

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FLETCHER, Judge. Rogelio Calixtro petitions for a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that modification of his pretrial release conditions is illegal and that he is entitled to reinstatement of the original terms. We deny the petition for habeas corpus. Calixtro was arrested and charged with a sexual battery. At first appearance, the state moved the court to set Calixtro’s bond on the basis of his prior con

Appeal from a judgment of the Superior Court for Kang County, No. 05-2-10061-3, Bruce W. Hilyer, J., entered April 17, 2008. Affirmed by unpublished opinion per Appelwick, J., concurred in by Agid and Lau, JJ.

OPINION Before the Court are relator's petitions for habeas corpus relating to the trial court's August 4, 2010, orders of contempt and writs of commitment. Among other issues, relator complains that he was wrongfully denied a jury trial. We agree with relator. Accordingly, we grant the writs of habeas corpus, set aside the orders of contempt and writs of commitment, and order relator discharged. Prior to the start of his criminal contempt proc

753 N.W.2d 746 (2008) STATE of Minnesota, Appellant, v. Charles Howard McCRAY, II, Respondent. No. A06-857. Supreme Court of Minnesota. July 31, 2008. *747 John B. Galus, Asst. Atty. General, St. Paul, Janelle Prokopec Kendall, Stearns County Atty., St. Cloud, for Appellant. Mark D. Nyvold, St. Paul, for Respondent.

PER CURIAM. After being convicted at trial of aggravated fleeing and eluding, Bruce McCray filed a facially sufficient rule 3.850 postcon-viction motion and an evidentiary hearing was held. Following that hearing, the trial court denied relief. We affirm. Under the standard enunciated in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687, 104 S.Ct. 2052, 80 L.Ed.2d 674 (1984), to prevail on a claim t

MYERS, J., for the Court. ¶ 1. Anthony McCray pled guilty to murder and was sentenced to life in prison. McCray filed a motion for post-conviction relief which was summarily denied by the trial court. Feeling aggrieved by that decision, McCray appeals to this Court pro se and in forma pauperis seeking review of the following issues: I. DID THE TRIAL COURT ERR IN

PER CURIAM. The petitioner, a criminal defendant on bond making a routine appearance before the circuit court, was summarily ordered to be drug tested, taken into custody and had his bond revoked under circumstances virtually identical to those in Reyes v. McCray, 879 So.2d 1269 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004) and Hernandez v. McCray, 879 So.2d 60 (Fla. 3d DCA 2004). On the authority of those cases, we grant habeas corpus

PER CURIAM. We reverse the sentence imposed as there was a downward departure from the sentencing guidelines without written reasons. Additionally, on remand, McCray shall be afforded the option of withdrawing his plea of guilty and reinstating a plea of not guilty, as the record reflects that the plea was entered in exchange for the sentence imposed. HERSEY, C.J., and LETTS and STONE, JJ., concur.</

I concur with the majority opinion that McCray's conviction must be reversed and his case remanded for a new trial because race was the "motivating and deciding factor in the state's removal of at least one prospective black juror from the venire." 738 So.2d at 915. The majority goes on to state that "even if the state were to come forward with race-neutral explanations for its strikes against the black potential jurors on McCray's venire, the peremptory strikes would not be upheld, b

332 S.C. 536 (1998) 506 S.E.2d 301 The STATE, Respondent, v. Charles Allen McCRAY, Appellant. No. 24841. Supreme Court of South Carolina. Heard January 10, 1996. Decided September 28, 1998. *539 Assistant Appellant Defender Robert M. Pachak, of South Carolina Office of Appellate Defense, C

209 B.R. 410 (1997) In re Louis McCRAY, Debtor. AMW CABLE COMPANY, INC., Plaintiff, v. Louis McCRAY and Jeffrey Levingston, Chapter 7 Panel Trustee, Defendants. Bankruptcy No. 94-12335, Adversary No. 96-1252. United States Bankruptcy Court, N.D. Mississippi. April 10, 1997. *411 Charles Victor McTeer, McTeer and Associates, G

PER CURIAM. Charles McCray appeals the summary denial of his motion for postconviction relief. We affirm in part and reverse in part. All of the issues presented in the motion relate to the trial court’s decision to sentence McCray as a habitual felony offender. § 775.084, Fla.Stat. (1988 Supp.). Most of McCray’s arguments are without merit, or should have been raised (if at all) on direct appeal. However, w

MEMORANDUM OPINION BAILEY, Judge: Stanley Glanz, Sheriff of Tulsa County (Sheriff), and the Board of County Commissioners of Tulsa County (County or, collectively, Appellants) seek review of an order of the Trial Court granting the application for writ of mandamus by Larry McCray d/b/a Larry’s Snack Shop (McCray) and the State of Oklahoma ex rel. the Department of Human Services (DHS). In this app

Talton and Jennifer Posey appeal from a judgment based on a jury verdict in favor of Talton Posey for $2,156.93 and in favor of Jennifer Posey for $3,200. The Poseys filed this action against Willie McCray as a result of an automobile accident. The jury found in the Poseys' favor, and the trial court entered judgment in accordance with the verdict. The Poseys moved for a new trial, alleging inadequacy of damages. The motion was denied via Rule 59.1, Alabama Rules of Civil Proce

Lonnie McCray was indicted for murder, in violation of §13A-6-2, Code of Alabama 1975. He was found "guilty as charged in the indictment" and was sentenced to 20 years in prison. He raises four issues on appeal. I The appellant contends that the State violated the mandates of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712,90 L.Ed.

The appellant, Robert McCray, was convicted of kidnapping in the second degree, a violation of § 13A-6-44, Code of Alabama 1975, and of assault in the second degree, a violation of §13A-6-21, Code of Alabama 1975. He was sentenced as a habitual offender to 25 years for the kidnapping conviction and to 10 years for the assault conviction. The state's evidence tended to show that the appellant and his friend, B

McDONALD, Justice. We approve the district court’s dismissing the state’s appeal as untimely filed, State v. McCray, 544 So.2d 313 (Fla. 2d DCA 1989), because we have decided this issue in Fox v. District Court of Appeal, 553 So.2d 161 (Fla.1989), and State v. Hieber, 553 So.2d 704 (Fla.1989), adversely to the state. It is so ordered. EHRLICH, C.J., and OVERTON, SHAW, B

Robert McCray (the appellant) and Boise Minor were jointly indicted in a three-count indictment: (1) count I charged the appellant with kidnapping in the first degree, in violation of § 13A-6-43, Code of Alabama 1975; (2) count II charged the appellant *Page 674 with attempted murder, in violation of §§ 13A-4-2 and 13A-6-2, Code of Alabama 1975