Cases

532 U.S. 731 (2001) BOOTH v. CHURNER et al. No. 99-1964. United States Supreme Court. Argued March 20, 2001. Decided May 29, 2001. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT *733 Souter, J., delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court. Nancy Winkelman argued the cause for

57 Cal.App.4th 91 (1997) RALPH CALVIN BOOTH, Petitioner, v. THE SUPERIOR COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY, Respondent; THE PEOPLE, Real Party in Interest Docket No. B108794. Court of Appeals of California, Second District, Division Seven. August 18, 1997. *93 COUNSEL Michael P. Judge, Public Defender, William M. Thornbury and J

Opinion issued October 3, 2013 In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-12-00919-CR ——————————— CALVIN RAY RANDLE, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TE

In the Court of Appeals Second Appellate District of Texas at Fort Worth ___________________________ No. 02-20-00140-CR No. 02-20-00149-CR ___________________________ JAMES CALVIN MASSEY, Appellant V. THE STATE OF TEXAS On Appeal from the 371st District Court Tarrant County, Texas Trial Court Nos. 1572638D, 1632168D Before Kerr, Birdwell, and Bassel, JJ. Opinion on Rehearing by

In re Hawthorne, Anton; — Plaintiff(s); applying for writ of certiorari and/or review; Parish of Orleans, Civil District Court, Div. “A”, No. 94-15850; to the Court of Appeal, Fourth Circuit, No. 95CA-1560. Denied. CALOGERO, C.J., and KIMBALL and JOHNSON, JJ., would grant the writ. WATSON, J., not on panel.

ORDER Curtis Fuller, proceeding pro se, appeals a district court judgment dismissing his civil rights complaint filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This case has been referred to a panel of the court pursuant to Rule 34(j)(1), Rules of the Sixth Circuit. Upon examination, this panel unanimously agrees that oral argument is not needed. Fed. R.App. P. 34(a). Seeking monetary relief, Fuller sued numerous pr

CONCUR and Opinion Filed June 29, 2021 S In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-19-01431-CV TOWN OF HIGHLAND PARK, Appellant V. TIFFANY RENEE MCCULLERS, ET AL., Appellee On Appeal from the 191st Judicial District Court Dallas County, Texas

84 F.2d 377 (1936) KEMP-BOOTH CO., Limited, v. CALVIN. No. 7768. Circuit Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit. June 1, 1936. *378 Riddell & Brackett, of Seattle, Wash., for appellant. Earl G. Rice, McClure & McClure, Walter A. McClure, and Wm. E. McClure, all of Seattle, Wash., for appellee. Before WILBUR, GARREC

Reversed and Dismissed and Opinion Filed June 29, 2021 In The Court of Appeals Fifth District of Texas at Dallas No. 05-19-01431-CV TOWN OF HIGHLAND PARK, Appellant V. TIFFANY RENEE MCCULLERS, ET AL., Appellees On Appeal from the 191st Judicial District Cour

OPINION {¶ 1} Defendant-appellant, Duffy Homes, Inc. ("Duffy Homes"), appeals from a judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas in favor of plaintiffs-appellees, Gail L. Booth and Calvin L. Booth (collectively, "the Booths"), on the Booths' claim for breach of warranty. The Booths conditionally cross-appeal from the trial court's entry of summary judgment in favor of Duffy Homes on the Booths' claim for violati

Reversed and Rendered and Memorandum Opinion filed May 5, 2011. In The Fourteenth Court of Appeals ___________________

In The Court of Appeals Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont _________________ NO. 09-12-00521-CV _________________ CALVIN BROWN, Appellant V. CB&I, INC., MIKE SOSSMAN, IRVING GATICA, & MIKE ANDERSON, Appellees _

617 S.E.2d 185 (2005) 274 Ga. App. 226 ROUSE v. POLOTT et al. No. A05A0760. Court of Appeals of Georgia. July 7, 2005. *186 Calvin Rouse, Augusta, for Appellant. Roger Sumrall, Jonathan Bell, Hall Booth Smith & Slover P.C., Atlanta, for Appellee. PHIPPS, Judge. Gregory Rouse was dr

Steele Hays, Justice, dissenting. Appellant sought a hearing before the probate j udge on allegations that under a settlement between Thomas Joe Booth and Roland Booth, Thomas Joe Booth was acquiring the estates of his natural mother and adoptive father, when in fact he had caused their deaths by stabbing. Certified copies of criminal convictions in Texas accompanied appellants’ petition. The public

WOLF, Judge. Appellant, Calvin Smith, appeals, pro se, the denial of his motion for postconviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850, without an evidentiary hearing. Smith’s motion for postconviction relief was based upon the ground that the court illegally sentenced him to consecutive mandatory minimum sentences for two counts contained in case number 81-4073. The sentences imposed

PER CURIAM. Appellant seeks review of an order denying his amended motion seeking post-conviction relief pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. That motion made three claims alleging ineffective assistance of counsel. Following an eviden-tiary hearing on the first of those claims, the trial court denied the motion in its entirety. We affirm the denial of the first claim. However, as the state concedes, it ap

PER CURIAM. Calvin Smith moved for post-conviction relief in the circuit court, contending that his sentence improperly provided for consecutive mandatory minimum terms. The trial court denied relief, attaching a copy of the sentencing hearing of April 15, 1982, as supporting its conclusion that the sentence imposed was legal. On appeal this court reversed, directing the circuit court to either attach additional portions of

Opinion filed May 22, 2008 O

PER CURIAM. We affirm the trial court’s denial of appellant’s motion, filed pursuant to rule 3.800(a), Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure, without prejudice to appellant’s right to file in the trial court a proper motion pursuant to rule 3.850, Florida Rules of Criminal Procedure. AFFIRMED. BOOTH, SMITH and WEBSTER, JJ., concur.

PER CURIAM. This cause is before us on appeal from an order summarily denying appellant’s motion for postconviction relief under Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850. Although appellant has raised a series of claims, we address only his contention that the trial court erred in summarily denying his claim that he was improperly convicted of two separate conspiracies, when he had entered into only one agreement.