Cases

Dismissed.

Opinion issued September 1, 2020 In The Court of Appeals For The First District of Texas ———————————— NO. 01-18-01002-CV ——————————— JERALD A. BROWN, Appellant V. WELLS FARGO BANK N.A., Appellee

AFFIRMED.

Opinion YEGAN, J. —Some appeals are filed to delay the inevitable. This is such an appeal. It is frivolous and was “ ‘dead on arrival’ at the appellate courthouse.” (Estate of Gilkison (1998) 65 Cal.App.4th 1443, 1449 [77 Cal.Rptr.2d 463].) Jane Brown was/is in default on a home mortgage. Foreclosure proceedings were commenced and she filed suit to prevent the sale of her home.

28 So.3d 55 (2010) BROWN v. WELLS FARGO BANK. No. 3D08-1778. District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District. February 10, 2010. Decision Without Published Opinion Affirmed.

MEMORANDUM OPINION GRANTING DEFENDANT’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT BARBARA J. ROTHSTEIN, UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE Plaintiff LaTawnya Brown (“Brown”) brought suit against Defendant Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo”), alleging that Wells Fargo’s predecessor, World Savings Bank, F.S.B. (“World Savings”) committed c

MEMORANDUM OPINION Granting in Part and Denying in Part Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss BARBARA JACOBS ROTHSTEIN, District Judge. Latawnya Brown (“Brown”) brings suit against Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (“Wells Fargo” or “the Bank”), alleging that World Savings Bank (“World”) committed fraud and violated the District of Columbia Consumer

968 So.2d 572 (2007) BROWN v. WELLS FARGO BANK. N.A. No. 3D07-2259. District Court of Appeal of Florida, Third District. November 20, 2007. Decision without published opinion. Vol. dismissed.

KITCHING, J., Concurring. I agree with the majority that the arbitration provision at issue in this case was not unconscionable for the reasons stated in the majority’s opinion. I also agree with the majority that the order denying defendants’ motion to compel arbitration should be reversed, and that the matter should be remanded so that the trial court can adjudicate plaintiffs’ constructive fraud defense to defendants’ motio

Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Brown (2020 NY Slip Op 06576) Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v Brown 2020 NY Slip Op 06576 Decided on November 12, 2020 Appellate Division, Second Department Published by New York State Law Reporting Bu

Korsmo, J. ¶1 — The trial court found that Willard and Holly Brown had abandoned their house in Clarkston and could no longer claim the homestead exemption in subsequent foreclosure proceedings. Because the record supports that determination, we affirm. FACTS ¶2 The Browns were the sole shareholders of WW Cedar Company Inc. In August 2006, they obtained a $200,000 Small Business Administra

Page 244 CONNECTICUT LAW JOURNAL February 8, 2022 430 FEBRUARY, 2022 341 Conn. 430 Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. v. Lorson WELLS FARGO BANK, N.A. v. ERIC LORSON ET AL. (SC 20194) Robinson, C. J., and Palmer, McDonald, D’Auria,

*********************************************** The “officially released” date that appears near the be- ginning of each opinion is the date the opinion will be pub- lished in the Connecticut Law Journal or the date it was released as a slip opinion. The operative date for the be- ginning of all time periods for filing postopinion motions and petitions for certification is the “officially released” date appearing in the opinion. All opinions are subject to modification and technical corr

ELGO, J. The defendants, Eric Lorson and Laurin Maday, appeal from the judgment of strict foreclosure rendered by the trial court in favor of the plaintiff, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. On appeal, the defendants claim that the court improperly found that the plaintiff met its burden of proving its prima facie case and that the defendants failed to prove their special defenses of equitable est

MARTHA VÁZQUEZ, United States District Judge THIS MATTER comes before the Court on McCarthy & Holthus's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiffs' Claims Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and the Applicable Statutes of Limitation [Doc. 7], Wells Fargo Bank, N.A.'s Motion to Dismiss [Doc. 8], and Motion to Strike Plaintiffs' Notice of Supplemental Authorities [Doc. 25]. The Court, having considered the motions, briefs, and

POSNER, Circuit Judge. In 2006 the plaintiff, Derick Berry, had taken out a 30-year, fixed-rate mortgage of approximately $270,000 to pay for improvements to his Chicago home. He denies having missed any payments on the mortgage, but nevertheless the mortgage was foreclosed later that year. He fought the foreclosure. The following year HSBC, as trustee of the mortgagee, took over the foreclosure suit against Berry. Years of

PER CURIAM. The defendant, Michael John Melahn, 1 appeals, specifically pursuant to Practice Book § 61-2, 2 from the judgment of the trial court rendered in favor of the plaintiff, Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., as trustee, on the defendant

William J. Boyce, Justice Appellee Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. sued appellant Gerald Godoy to collect a deficiency on a debt that Godoy guaranteed. Godoy moved for summary judgment on grounds that Wells Fargo's claims were *51barred by a two-year statute of limitations applying to deficiency claims; Wells Fargo moved for partial summary judgment on gro

Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit. PER CURIAM: Clotilde C. Jimenez appeals the district court’s order granting Defendants’ motion to dismiss the complaint. We have reviewed the record and find no reversible error. Accordingly, we affirm for the reasons stated by the district court. See Jimenez v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 1:16-cv-00624-CMH-MSN, 2016 WL 4059161 (E.D. Va. file

Opinion McINTYRE, J. —In this case, a national bank sued California residents in Iowa and served them via substitute service with the Iowa Secretary of State as allowed by Iowa’s long-arm statute, Iowa Code section 617.3, subdivision (2) (section 617.3). The national bank obtained a default judgment against the California residents in Iowa and registered that judgment in California pursuant to the Sister State